The allowlist is local
Which commands auto-run, which are denied and whether the agent can delete files are settings on each machine. Nothing central sees the configuration or the decisions it makes.
Cursor's agent mode edits files, runs terminal commands and calls MCP servers from inside the editor, often with auto-run switched on. Background agents do the same from the cloud. Agen judges each action at runtime, against the developer behind it, and records the verdict. The team keeps Cursor.

Cursor's agent is the most used surface in the product. These are the things it can do on a machine with your developer's credentials.
Cursor's allowlist, denylist and team rules are useful, and engineering should keep them. They are configured on the machine by the person the agent acts for.
Which commands auto-run, which are denied and whether the agent can delete files are settings on each machine. Nothing central sees the configuration or the decisions it makes.
Changes land under the developer's git identity and credentials. When something ships badly, the author field is a person's name, and nothing distinguishes their choice from the agent's.
A background agent acts on your repository from a cloud environment. Endpoint tools cannot see it and the local allowlist does not apply.
Team settings cover the editor, not the action. There is no central verdict, no per-action log outside the machine, and nothing to show an auditor.
The gateway decides. Shield enforces where the gateway cannot see. AgenShield sits on the device, does not change how Cursor is used, and stops the crossing action before it executes. Background agents are decided at the gateway.
Cursor's agent runs on the developer's machine, so AgenShield does the work: the gateway's verdict, enforced where the gateway cannot see. BrowserShield covers what the same developer pastes into AI tools in the browser. Background agents are decided at the gateway where they reach your repositories.
Out-of-policy actions like touching production secrets or mass-deleting files are stopped before they execute. Everything else flows. Ships through your MDM.
Keys and sensitive data are recognised as they are pasted into AI tools, and the paste is blocked. Employees keep their tools. Only the leak stops.
Illustrative verdicts for common Cursor actions under a typical policy.
| Cursor action | Verdict | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Multi-file edit inside the workspace | allow | In scope for the developer and the task. Logged, not interrupted. |
| Auto-run the test suite | allow | Normal engineering work on the developer's own machine. |
| Auto-run a command that touches ~/.ssh or cloud credentials | deny | A credential has no place in an agent's context. Blocked before it executes, whatever the allowlist says. |
| Delete files outside the workspace | deny | Outside task scope on a device with the developer's privileges. |
| Background agent opens a pull request to a protected branch | human-in-the-loop | The launching developer reviews before the change reaches the branch. |
| Query a customer database through an MCP server | mask | The query runs. Personal data is masked before it enters the model context. |
| Add an MCP server not on the approved list | step-up | A new door. The developer confirms it once, and the record shows who opened it. |
| Send workspace contents to an external URL | deny | Recognised at the point of exfiltration and blocked in-line. |
Verdicts are illustrative defaults. Every row is a policy you write once and Agen enforces per action, per identity.
Thirty minutes on the way your teams already use Cursor. We show the verdict on each action, the named human behind the session, and the record it leaves. Bring your hardest question.
It never crosses your network controls, and no log outside that machine would record the attempt. AgenShield stops it on the device.
Cursor stays exactly as your engineers use it today.
The same three capabilities govern Cursor and every other agent you run, internal and external.
Continuous discovery across your IdP, gateway, devices, cloud, and registries. Nothing has to self-register: agents are found, risk-scored, and resolved to a named human before they act.
Per-action verdicts on the device, a named developer behind every agent run.