A product built around the person using AI.
Almost everything Prompt Security does well is organised around a human being present: a sensor in the browser they are typing into, guidance at the moment they compose a prompt, coaching when they get it wrong the first time. That is a genuinely good design, and it is worth being precise about where its assumptions stop holding.
Three touchpoints, four enforcement points
The product is sold as three touchpoints and deployed as four enforcement points, and the two do not line up one to one. Worth separating, because a buyer evaluating agent governance is usually shown the employee product first.
- The browser extensionDOM-level interaction awareness, real-time prompt inspection, context-aware redaction and in-moment guidance, installed locally so data is caught before it leaves the machine. It ships through standard device management in minutes. This is the strongest thing in the product and it wins its row.
- The endpoint agenta separate, system-wide client that watches local model execution — desktop assistants, local models, autonomous agents and MCP servers running on the machine. It detects new agents, their active skills and connectors, and can restrict a risky capability or disable a connector before execution rather than after.
- The MCP gatewaysits between agents and MCP servers, inspecting every request and response, allowing or blocking by user, server or action, against a catalogue of more than thirteen thousand MCP servers it risk-scores. It evaluates every agent action before that action executes, with rules written per agent, per tool and per workflow.
- The application patha reverse proxy or lightweight agent for an organisation's own AI applications, plus direct coverage of AI code assistants inside the development workflow, redacting secrets, PII and intellectual property across nearly thirty programming languages.
Where Prompt Security is strongest
Three of the sixteen rows below go to Prompt Security and four more are level. They follow from a real difference in where each product places itself: theirs is on the path data travels, ours is on the decision an agent's action requires.
- The browserthis row goes to them by two and it is the clearest loss we publish on this page. Their extension reads the page at DOM level, inspects a prompt as it is being composed, redacts in context and guides the person in the moment, deployed through existing device management. BrowserShield is in early access and carries a 3 on every comparison we publish. When it reaches general availability the number changes in the rubric and every page inherits it — until then it stays where it is.
- The network layerproxy deployment and network monitoring are theirs by design, and that row is scored a 2 for us on every comparison. We govern the action rather than the path, and we run alongside whatever already sits in that path — which is what lets one policy also reach an agent that never crosses it.
- Where you can buy itthe product is now part of a major endpoint security platform and is transactable both through that platform's marketplace and a cloud marketplace against committed spend, with self-hosted variants of all three touchpoints for buyers with residency requirements. We are a focused platform rather than a marketplace presence, and that row is a 2 for us everywhere.
- Level, not lostfour rows come out even and they are substantial ones. Redaction at the moment of action — their signature capability — stands beside ours rather than below it. Every agent action is evaluated before it executes, which is a level score on the row that separates a runtime product from a grant-time one. The audit record covers every agent action and decision. And their endpoint client is a real client, not a hook, so that row is level too.
The case with nobody at the keyboard
Read the employee product carefully and its assumptions are visible in the features themselves. Non-intrusive explanations of risk, shown to someone as they compose. Coaching on a first violation, escalating to enforcement on repeats. A sensor installed in the browser a person is looking at. Every one of those controls needs somebody there to receive it.
That is not a criticism of the design. It is the correct design for the problem it was built for, which is the enormous and real problem of employees pasting things into AI tools. It is worth stating plainly because agent governance is a different problem wearing similar words, and the difference is exactly the absence of that person.
An agent that runs on a schedule, reconciles a ledger and writes back to a system of record at four in the morning cannot be coached. There is no prompt being composed, no browser session, and no one to show an explanation to. What that action needs is not guidance but a decision, made before it lands, against something that says whether this agent — acting for a particular person — was permitted to do it.
A role is not a person
The gateway's policy model is documented in some detail, and it is a real model. Rules apply per agent, per tool and per workflow, evaluated against the agent's role, real-time situational factors, its behavioural history, and the trust relationships between agents, MCP servers and the data sources underneath them. That is a great deal more context than most products bring to a tool call.
It is also a description of the agent, not of anybody accountable for it. A role is a property the agent carries; behavioural history is a property of how it has acted. Neither answers the question an auditor asks first, which is who authorised this and who answers for it. On the employee side that question has an easy answer, because the sensor is bound to the person using it and their prompts are attributed to them by name. The two halves of the product answer it differently, which is why attribution scores a 3 rather than a 1 or a 5.
Agen holds the accountable human as a durable property of the agent rather than a property of a session. Every agent has a named owner, and every individual action resolves back to that owner whether or not anyone was watching when it ran. That is a different object to hold, and it has to be held before the action rather than reconstructed from a log afterwards.
The meter counts people
The commercial model is the clearest single statement of what the product is organised around, and it is published rather than inferred. There are six purchasable dimensions: employees, AI code assistants and homegrown applications, each with a self-hosted variant. They are billed independently of one another, and each scales by the number of users it covers. A user is defined as one person whose AI activity the platform covers.
For governing what employees do with AI that unit is exactly right, because the population being governed is the workforce and the workforce is countable. For agents it is the wrong denominator in a specific way: the number of agents in an enterprise is not tracking headcount, and a team of ten shipping four hundred agents is billed as ten. That sounds like it favours the buyer until the governance question is asked — those four hundred agents are the thing that needed governing, and they were never what was being counted.
Agen is priced per governed agent, with no prerequisite tier, which is why both commercial rows go the way they do. Our own row here is a 4 rather than a 5: for a buyer already paying for an incumbent, we are net-new spend, and that caveat is why the 4 is credible.
What is not published
Nine of the forty-two rows we score were dropped rather than published. Decision latency is the notable one: third-party summaries cite a figure, no vendor page publishes it, and a number we cannot trace to primary documentation does not score in either direction. Delegated access and agent-to-agent authority chaining are undocumented on both sides, so they were dropped rather than guessed in our favour. Identity-provider compatibility could not be checked at all, because the integrations page does not resolve.
One row was dropped on fairness rather than evidence. Connector breadth would have set their published figures — thousands of AI services observed, thousands of MCP servers risk-scored — against ours, which count connectors we broker actions through. Those are different measurements, and putting them in one row would have flattered us with a number that does not mean the same thing.
One more is ours. Self-hosted deployment ties at the top of the scale, on every touchpoint, and it did not make the sixteen. It is credited here instead: for a buyer with data residency requirements, that is a genuine strength and it belongs in the evaluation whether or not it discriminates between the two columns.