What the credential is part of.
Most comparisons on this site turn on whether a product can stop an agent mid-action. This one does not, because Highflame can, and the table prints three level rows saying so. The distinction is narrower and it sits one layer down: what the identity behind that verdict belongs to, and how far the enforcement reaches once the agent stops being a coding agent.
The runtime rows are level, and that is the finding
It is worth being unambiguous before anything else on this page: the runtime group does not separate. Policy is evaluated inline, out of band, before the action executes. The decision figure is published rather than implied, and there is a public gateway benchmark with methodology behind it. A block lands on the individual action while the agent carries on. Verdicts are not limited to allow and deny — actions can be shaped, paused for a human, or stopped.
Nothing in that paragraph is posture work relabelled, and a page that pretended otherwise would be wrong on the first row a technical reader checked. Three rows publish level at the top of the scale, and the argument this page makes has to survive that.
Where Highflame is strongest
Four of the sixteen rows go to them, plus the three level ones above and three more elsewhere in the table. They are worth reading as a set, because three of the four follow from the same decision: publish the substrate and meet the traffic where it already flows.
- An identity core you can readthe identity engine ships open source under Apache 2.0, built on SPIFFE and WIMSE subjects, OAuth 2.1 grants, RFC 8693 token exchange, DPoP-bound tokens and CAE cascade revocation, and it deploys in a customer's own VPC. For a buyer who wants to inspect the authority layer rather than take a vendor's word for it, that is a genuine and checkable advantage, and this row goes to them without qualification. We make the opposite bet — a commercial platform on the same published standards, with the seven-year identity foundation it runs on already in production — and both bets are legible to a procurement team.
- Enforcement in the browsera browser extension evaluates prompts, file uploads and clipboard content against enterprise policy, with violation metadata syncing back to the enterprise account. Our own browser coverage is in early access and scored a 3 on every comparison on this site until it reaches general availability, so this row goes to them on the published state of both products rather than on the roadmap.
- The network layera partner integration evaluates requests inline as they cross the network and blocks them before they reach a model provider, with a monitor mode to tune against real traffic first. We do not enforce at that layer and do not claim to — we govern the action and run alongside whatever holds the network — so this row goes to them too.
- Distribution and ecosysteman open-source identity engine, a scanner on Docker Hub and a product listed on the GitHub Marketplace put them in front of developers in places a focused platform is not. We score a 2 on that row against every vendor, and it does not move here.
One fabric, or one more fabric
The widest row in the table is the one about what agent identity is unified with, and it turns on an architectural position stated plainly in their own material: human identity systems were built for users, non-human identity was built for services and workloads, and agents are neither, so agents need an identity built for agents. The product follows that reasoning honestly. It connects to the identity provider and directory already in place and adds agent-shaped claims on top — owner, trust tier, framework, delegation depth — for the agents no existing system attributes.
That is a reasonable design and it ships today. It also means an enterprise ends up operating agent identity as a layer above the place its human and machine identities live, with two systems that have to agree about a person for the attribution to hold. The claim on the credential names an owner. Whether that owner is still employed, still in that role, still entitled to the system the agent is reaching, is a fact held somewhere else.
Agen runs humans, machines and agents on the same fabric, on a customer identity foundation that has been in production for seven years. An agent is not a claim referring to a person in another system; the person and the agent are primitives in one place, which is why entitlement at the moment of the action is a lookup rather than a reconciliation. That is the row, and it is the only one in the identity group with real distance in it.
Where the enforcement reaches
The enforcement points are named precisely, which makes this easy to score in both directions: model traffic, the IDE, the tool gateway, and agent-to-agent calls. For coding agents that is deep coverage — policy evaluated before a prompt is submitted, before a shell command runs, before a tool call fires, across Cursor, Claude Code, Copilot, Windsurf and anything speaking MCP, with tool surfaces scanned before an agent can load them.
The endpoint row scores on what sits between those points. There is no device-side control governing an agent that is not a coding agent and not routed through the gateway, and the cloud and SaaS row scores the same way: enforcement happens where the traffic is routed, and an agent acting directly against a SaaS application outside that path has nothing standing in front of it. Discovery reaches further than enforcement does — it is agentless and continuous across clouds, IDEs, SaaS and MCP connections, and it scores level with ours at the top of the scale.
This is the ordinary shape of a product that grew from the developer surface outward, and it is not a criticism of the depth there. It is a boundary a buyer can check against their own agent inventory in an afternoon: count the agents that are neither a coding assistant nor routed through a gateway, and that count is the gap.
Internal by construction
Four solution pages are published, and all four are internal: engineering, security, IT and platform, compliance. The framing throughout is an enterprise governing the agents acting inside its own environment — discovering them, scoping them, revoking them, proving what they did.
The other half of the problem is not addressed anywhere in the published material: the agents a company's own customers point at its product, which need per-tenant governance keyed to that product's customer model rather than to its employee directory. For a company shipping an agent-facing surface, that is not an adjacent use case — it is the same policy question with a different principal on the other end, and it is the row where this table separates by three.
What is not published
The pricing row publishes on an absence rather than a number. There is no pricing or packaging page in the published URL set, and pricing appears only as an agenda item inside a booked demo. That is a normal early enterprise motion and not a criticism, but it means the cost of governing a hundred agents cannot be modelled before a sales conversation, and the row says exactly that. The total-cost row was dropped rather than scored twice off the same absence.
Two other rows were held. Their new-integration commitment is not published, and scoring an unpublished figure against our own three-day one would measure documentation habits rather than capability. Our own audit-first rollout row stays held pending internal confirmation, which is the fifth comparison in a row it has sat out — they document a monitor mode, and the row would probably be level.