What Entro's policy decides about.
Two products can both apply policy in real time and still be governing different things. Entro governs the credential an agent holds — it discovers it, owns it, right-sizes it, time-bounds it, rotates it and retires it. That is a complete answer to a real problem, and it is a different problem from whether this agent, acting for this person, was allowed to do this thing.
Three pillars over one identity graph
The platform is organised as three pillars sharing one graph of identities, the secrets behind them, and the resources they reach. They are worth scoring separately, because a buyer evaluating agent governance is usually shown the third and buying the first two.
- Secrets Securitydetection of over 1,200 secret types across the whole software lifecycle — source code, pre-commit hooks, pull requests, automation, cloud and on-prem, collaboration apps and vaults. An AI triage model reads each finding's type, purpose and context to clear false positives autonomously, and every incident is attributed to the engineer, team or service that created it.
- Non-Human Identitiesevery service account, token and API key unified into one contextualised inventory, governed from creation through usage to retirement. Posture management removes idle and stale identities, right-sizes permissions and eliminates over-privileged access, while NHIDR baselines each identity's normal activity and triggers remediation when behaviour departs from it.
- Agentic Governance and Administrationthe agent layer. It builds a structured profile from three sources — where an agent runs, the targets it touches, and the identities it uses to touch them — surfaces local agent runtimes through an EDR integration, connects natively to the agent foundries, and enforces real-time policy over which AI client may access which resource, when, and for how long.
Where Entro is strongest
Three of the sixteen rows below go to Entro and two more are level. Two of the three are not features we are behind on — they are disciplines we do not practise, because each product starts from a different object: theirs is the credential, ours is the action.
- Finding the secrets nobody vaultedthis row goes to them outright and it is not close. Over 1,200 secret types detected across the entire lifecycle, triaged by a model that reads the context around each finding rather than pattern-matching it, and routed to the person who committed it. We do not scan any surface for exposed credentials. We govern what an agent does with the access a credential grants, which is a different job and does not replace this one.
- Rotation, vaulting and retirementrotation on a schedule with policy enforced through automated workflow integrations, dual-secret switchover so a rotation does not take a service down, encrypted vault storage, vault monitoring for fetching anomalies and privilege creep, and reporting on secrets that have gone idle or missed their rotation window. Credential hygiene is a whole discipline and it belongs to them. We govern the use of a credential rather than its lifecycle.
- Where you can buy ittransactable through a major cloud marketplace against committed spend, with more than eighty named integrations spanning twenty-two categories from EDR and SIEM to vaults, ticketing and SOC automation. We are a focused platform rather than a marketplace presence, and the table reflects that.
- Level, not losttwo rows come out even and both are commercial. Neither product requires a buyer to already hold a prerequisite suite or platform tier, which is a real advantage both of us have over the bundled incumbents. And neither of us lives inside the productivity suite we govern — we both govern it from outside, which is precisely what lets one policy also reach agents built anywhere else.
An owner on the identity is not an owner on the action
Ownership attribution is a headline capability here and it deserves the 4 it scores. Every discovered agent and identity is mapped with ownership, permissions, lineage and blast radius, and every secret incident resolves to the engineer or service that produced it. Most tools in this space cannot name a person at all.
What that answers is who made this identity. An accountable owner answers a narrower and more useful question: who answers for what this agent did at three in the morning. The first is derived from creation history and is a property of the object. The second has to be assigned, attested and carried forward onto every action the agent takes, including the autonomous runs with nobody in front of them.
This is why the identity group separates while the runtime group stays close. Attribution to a creator is a strong answer to a question about provenance. It is not the same object as accountability, and it cannot be turned into one by logging harder.
Grant time and action time are different tenses
Consider an agent with a valid, correctly-scoped credential for a customer database. It reads a record it is entitled to read and posts it into an internal channel it is entitled to post in. No permission is exceeded, no baseline is broken, no sanctioned target is violated. The grant was right and the action was wrong.
The published model has real answers either side of that moment. Beforehand, provisioning onboards the agent with the minimum permissions it needs, Just-In-Time access stops it holding elevated privilege longer than a task requires, and Segregation of Duties controls stop one identity accumulating conflicting scopes. Afterwards, behavioural detection notices when activity departs from the baseline and triggers remediation. Both are the right controls in the wrong tense for this case.
Agen evaluates entitlement in the moment, against the human behind the agent, with five verdict types rather than allow and deny — including step-up authentication and a human approval step before the action proceeds. Those rows in the table are not scored against a missing feature. They are scored against a decision object that describes access rather than actions.
Where the enforcement point sits
Coverage arrives through integrations rather than through anything installed in the path of the work. Cloud service providers, agent foundries, git repositories, CI/CD, vaults, collaboration tools and identity providers all connect over API with nothing to deploy — genuinely agentless, and one of the strongest capabilities on the sheet.
Two surfaces have no coverage. Local agent runtimes on a workstation are surfaced through an EDR integration the customer already owns, which means the enforcement point is somebody else's product and there is no control on the device itself. Nothing in the platform pages, the twenty-two integration categories or the six use cases addresses the browser at all — no extension, no in-browser control, no coverage of browser-driven agents. Those two rows are why endpoint and browser score where they do.
The same shape decides the intervention row. When something is wrong, the remediation acts on the credential: rotate the secret, right-size the permission, revoke the access, decommission the identity. Every one of those stops the agent rather than the action, which is the difference between a governed agent and a disabled one.
What is not published
Eight of the rows we score were not published. Two of them are the pricing rows: there is no pricing page, and the single public data point is a cloud-marketplace Starter Pack listed at a fixed annual figure whose unit the listing does not define. That means the cost of governing a hundred agents cannot be modelled before a sales conversation. It is a normal enterprise motion and it is not a criticism, but it is why a row that publishes on almost every comparison could not publish here.
Agent-to-agent delegation, on-behalf-of access, deployment model and integration SLA were dropped because no primary source addresses them in either direction. One more was dropped on fairness rather than evidence: connector and tool breadth measures a broker, and Entro brokers nothing — its integrations read telemetry from systems the customer already runs. Scoring that row would have measured our architecture rather than a capability theirs was built to have.