What Airia actually governs.
Most vendors in this category arrive at governance from security and reach toward the agents. Airia arrives from the other direction: it is the place the agents get built, so policy is a property of the platform they were built on. That is what makes the enforcement real, and it is what draws the line around it.
One platform, four jobs
The product is organised as four stages over a single inventory. They are worth scoring separately, because a buyer evaluating the governance is often shown the orchestration.
- Discoveran inventory of AI across the organisation, assembled from seven independent vectors — browser activity, connected SaaS applications, API calls to model providers, code repositories, identity-provider logs, network traffic through a SASE, and scans of installed applications on endpoints. It surfaces models, tools, MCP servers and agents, including agents built outside Airia entirely.
- Secureguardrails that inspect prompts, responses and workflow steps; constraints that control which tools an agent may invoke and validate execution parameters before an action proceeds; red teaming; and posture management that blocks unsafe data transfers and unauthorised tool access in real time.
- Governpolicies enforced at runtime rather than reviewed after the fact, a tamper-evident audit trail of every agent decision, risk classifications applied to agents, models and data sources, and approval steps routed to roles by risk class.
- Optimizethe build side — a visual agent builder extensible with Python, model routing, cost controls, a prototyping studio and the data integrations that connect an agent to the systems it acts on.
Where Airia is strongest
Two of the sixteen rows below go to Airia and three are level. They follow from a real difference in where each product starts: theirs is the platform the agent is built and run on, ours is the action the agent takes.
- Reach into the tools people already work inagents ship as Microsoft Teams, Slack, SharePoint, WhatsApp and email surfaces, which is a closer integration with the productivity suite than we have. We govern those suites from outside them, which is what lets one policy also reach agents built anywhere else — on any framework, on any cloud, and in front of your own customers.
- Catalog and marketplace breadthover a thousand pre-configured integrations, presented as the largest enterprise-ready MCP catalog, plus a cloud-marketplace listing. That is a wider distribution and integration footprint than ours today.
- Level with us on three rowsshadow-agent discovery, connector and tool breadth, and browser coverage. Seven discovery vectors is as complete as anything in this category, their published catalog figure stands beside ours, and browser AI activity and controls are scored level with BrowserShield while ours is in early access.
Enforcement reaches what it runs
Constraints that run as code at the execution layer are the right shape for the problem, and they earn a 4 at the moment of action rather than the 2 a discovery-first product earns. Tool invocation is controlled, execution parameters are validated before an action proceeds, and policy violations are blocked as they occur. None of that is posture work relabelled.
The question a buyer has to ask is which actions pass through that execution layer. Airia is the builder, the gateway and the runtime, so for an agent built in Airia the answer is all of them. For an agent built somewhere else, calling a system directly, the platform has a rich inventory record and seven ways to have found it — and no interception point. The published material asserts that centralized policies follow your agents into every model, tool and runtime; it does not describe the mechanism by which an action that never reaches Airia is stopped.
The verdict vocabulary is strong on the two outcomes that matter most and quiet on a third. Actions are blocked, regulated data is masked, and high-risk decisions escalate to a named reviewer with the context attached. What is not described is a step-up: asking the person the agent is acting for to re-authenticate before the action proceeds, rather than routing it to whoever holds the reviewing role.
A risk class is not an owner
Airia's accountability model is built on classification. Agents, models and data sources carry a risk classification applied proactively, approvals route by that classification to the role that should see them, and every approval is logged with who reviewed what and when. For an audit, that is a genuinely strong record, and the per-decision audit trail scores level with ours.
What the model does not carry is a person answerable for the agent itself. A risk class describes what an agent is; a reviewer is whoever was on the rota when something escalated. Neither is the name you need when an agent has been running unattended for six weeks and has just done something nobody expected. The identity provider is read here as a source of signal for finding AI activity, not as the fabric an agent's own identity lives in — which is why the attribution row scores a 2 while the audit row does not.
The agents your customers talk to
Every documented use case governs agents the enterprise runs for itself: agents its teams built in the studio, agents reaching internal systems through the gateway, agents delivered to staff as a chat surface in Teams or Slack. That is one half of the problem, and it is the half most vendors in this category have chosen.
The other half is the agent a company puts in front of its own customers — the one acting on a tenant it does not employ, against a customer record it does not own. It needs the same identity fabric and the same per-action verdicts as the internal one, and it is the row where the two products differ most.
What the contract does not say
There is no published pricing. The pricing page redirects to a demo request, and the cloud-marketplace listing states that pricing is based on your specific requirements and eligibility, by private offer. That is a normal enterprise motion and is scored as what it is rather than as a criticism — but an unpublished unit is a thing a buyer cannot model before the first call, and it cannot be compared against a competitor's without one.
Two other things a security review usually asks for are absent from the public material: which identity providers are supported for single sign-on and provisioning, and which deployment models and data-residency options exist. Both were scored in the worksheet and neither is published here, because absence of evidence is not evidence of absence — they are questions to put on the call, not rows to score against a vendor.